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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effects of local cocaine and heroin prices, AIDS rates, and needle
exchange programs on drug injection and needle sharing by adult male arrestees in 24 large U.S. cities
during 1989–1995.  Regressions that control for personal characteristics including income, fixed city
and year effects, and city-specific trends indicate that needle exchange programs decrease both
injection and sharing.  Increases in previous year AIDS prevalence reduce injection by both sharers
and non-sharers, leaving the proportion of injectors who share unchanged. Higher cocaine prices lead
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  The injection of illegal drugs such as heroin and cocaine is associated with substantial 
costs in terms of crime, criminal justice, and social services.  Beyond these, drug injection is a 
major public health problem.  In particular, drug injectors risk infection with blood-borne 
diseases such as HIV and hepatitis B and C through the sharing of infected needles, and can 
transmit these diseases to needle-sharing or sexual partners and their own children.  The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) attributes 42 percent of U.S. cumulative non-pediatric 
AIDS cases with known exposure category, and 45 percent of such cases reported in 2000, to 
drug injection.  Almost three-quarters of these cases stem from sharing needles, with the rest 
resulting from unprotected sex with a drug injector.  Moreover, 82 percent of cumulative 
pediatric cases with identified exposure category, and 86 percent of such cases in 2000, involved 
transmission from a mother infected through drug injection or having sex with a drug injector to 
her fetus or newborn child (CDC 2001). 
  The number of injection drug users in the U.S. is unclear.  Estimates include 900,000 by 
the CDC and 1.64 million by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Directors, with an average of three injections daily (Lurie et al. 1998).  The Treatment Episode 
Data Set (TEDS) indicates that 192,000 entrants to publicly funded drug treatment facilities in 
1999 injected the primary drug for which they sought treatment (SAMHSA 2001).  According to 
the 1999 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), slightly over three million 
individuals have previously injected drugs (SAMHSA 2002).  
  A rich source of information on drug injectors is data collected on arrestees in 24 large 
U.S. cities by the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program of the National Institute of Justice (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 1998).  During 1989–1997, 8.9 percent of arrestees reported injecting   2
drugs in the past six months.  Prevalence declined steadily during the period, from 16.2 percent 
to 8.3 percent for females and 12.0 percent to 6.7 percent for males, although rates among males, 
who make up around 70 percent of AIDS cases attributable to drug injection, remained level 
since 1994.
1  
  The drugs most often injected are cocaine and heroin.  In DUF, 75 percent of arrestees 
previously injecting drugs have injected cocaine and 69 percent have injected heroin, while 34 
percent have injected amphetamines and 20 percent have injected other drugs.  Similarly, the 
1999 NHSDA estimates that 1.93 million individuals have injected cocaine while 1.44 million 
have injected heroin and 1.08 million have injected stimulants (SAMHSA 2002).  While cocaine 
use greatly exceeds heroin use, heroin is far more likely to be injected than is cocaine.  For 
instance, rates of positive drug tests in DUF are 42 percent for cocaine and only 8 percent for 
heroin, but rates of past six month injection among those testing positive for use are 46 percent 
for heroin and only 12 percent for cocaine.  Similarly, in the 1999 TEDS (SAMHSA 2001), rates 
of injection among those seeking treatment were 66 percent for heroin users (down from 77 
percent in 1992) but only 6 percent for cocaine users.  
  This paper examines drug injection behavior among male DUF arrestees during 1989–
1995.
2  In particular, it investigates how recent injection and needle sharing responds to three 
factors: economic incentives, specifically income and prices of cocaine and heroin; perceived 
HIV infection risk, represented by AIDS prevalence; and needle exchange program presence.   
                                                 
1 Extrapolating from DUF to the general arrestee population, which Hunt and Rhodes (2001) argue is reasonable, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (1998) data on U.S. arrestee counts imply past six month drug injection by 1.08 
million arrestees nationwide in 1997.  If all drug injectors can be considered hardcore drug users, this translates to 
2.16 million past six month drug injectors overall according to the Rhodes et al. (2000) estimate that roughly one-
half of hardcore drug users are arrested annually.  
2 Though data collection began in late 1987 and continues today, I use data from 1989–1995 because many sample 
cities were not added until 1989, needle sharing questions were eliminated in mid-1995 when the survey instrument 
was altered, and needle exchange program data are incomplete after 1995.  The injection rates cited earlier include 
data only through 1997 because the sampling frame was altered in 1998 when DUF expanded to 35 cities and 
became the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program.   3
  Injected drugs are goods that are bought and sold in a market, albeit illegal, and thus 
should adhere to microeconomic principles regarding the impact of prices and income.  The 
same is true for needles used to inject drugs, suggesting relationships between economic factors 
and needle sharing that are the opposite directions to those for purchased goods.  Syringes cost 
about 25 cents each when legally obtained from a pharmacy.  However, five states have laws 
requiring a prescription to purchase syringes, and all but three states have drug paraphernalia 
laws that penalize syringe possession and distribution (Ruiz-Sierra 2001, Sidwell et al. 2001).
3  
On the illegal market, in contrast, syringes sold as “new” cost several dollars and often are in fact 
repackaged after being used by others who might be infected with HIV (Des Jarlais et al. 1996).  
Many studies have examined the impact of prices and income on cocaine and heroin use, but few 
have focused explicitly on injection, and none have investigated needle sharing.   
  Similarly, several studies have examined the impact of AIDS prevalence on sexual 
behaviors that expose individuals to HIV infection risk.  These studies assume that increases in 
local AIDS rates raise perceived probabilities of HIV infection and use AIDS data because they 
are much more extensive than are HIV data.  The CDC statistics cited earlier suggest that HIV 
infection risk is as relevant for drug injection, which has not been studied, as for risky sex. 
  Economic research has also yet to study needle exchange programs (NEPs).  Since NEPs 
provide sterile syringes in exchange for used ones in an effort to reduce blood-borne infection 
transmission by drug injectors, they are expected to decrease needle sharing.  NEPs also reduce 
the cost of drug injection.  Consequently, many lawmakers have assumed that NEPs encourage 
drug use, leading to a 1989 ban on federal NEP funding that is still in place.  But most NEPs also 
refer clients to drug treatment and offer HIV testing and counseling.  As NEP customers are 
                                                 
3 The five states with prescription laws are California, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  The three 
states without paraphernalia laws are Alaska, Iowa, and South Carolina, although some localities within the former 
two have ordinances restricting syringe possession and sale.   4
placed into treatment programs and provided with information on injection-related HIV risks and 
even their own HIV infection status, injection propensity and frequency should fall.   
  As of July 2002, 211 NEPs existed in 37 states, Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico 
(Purchase 2002) despite the federal funding ban and previously described laws that make NEPs 
illegal in many areas.  NEPs are funded either by permissive states and localities or privately, 
with some NEPs operating secretly and others in tacit agreement with local law enforcement 
agencies.  Data are difficult to obtain.  For instance, an October 1999 survey (Singh et al. 2001) 
was completed by only 84 percent of known programs, some of which asked for their identity 
not to be revealed.  The 107 responding programs operate at health van stops, sidewalk tables, 
cars, storefronts and health clinics, are open for an average of 20 hours per week, have a median 
yearly budget of $38,000, and exchanged 19.4 million syringes.  For DUF cities, time series of 
NEP characteristics are unavailable, but information on the date of first NEP opening allows for 
examination of how program presence impacts injection behavior.   
  The DUF data analyzed here are useful for various reasons.  Most importantly, 
information is available on recent drug injection and needle sharing.  In addition, arrestees 
represent a sizable fraction of drug injectors in the population, the sample size is large, and the 
sampling scheme allows for merging of several relevant variables that are measured at the city or 
metropolitan area level.  Results show that, controlling for arrestee characteristics, indicators for 
arrest city and survey year, and city-specific behavioral trends, each of the main factors under 
examination have a significant impact on drug injection behavior. 
  The paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the pertinent literature from economics 
and other disciplines, Section III discusses the data, Section IV outlines the estimation 
methodology, Section V presents the results of the analysis, and Section VI concludes.   5
II. Literature Review 
  The previous literature germane to this analysis can be divided into three topics.  Two of 
these, the effects of drug prices (and income) on drug use and the impact of disease infection 
risks on risky or protective behavior, have received attention from economists.  The third, the 
impact of NEPs on injection behavior, has been studied only by disciplines outside of economics. 
 Economic  Factors.  The only study that explicitly examines the impact of prices and 
income on drug injection is Bretteville-Jensen (1999), who analyzes heroin injection by 1,834 
males in Oslo, Norway.  She estimates heroin price elasticities of –0.36 for dealers and –1.51 for 
non-dealers and income elasticites of 0.59 for dealers and 0.51 for non-dealers. 
  Other studies have estimated price elasticities of cocaine and heroin use without regard to 
mode of administration.  In monthly 1970–73 data from 15 Detroit communities, Silverman and 
Spruill (1977) estimate a long-run heroin own-price elasticity of –0.25.  Using 1923–38 data on 
the Indonesian opium market, Van Ours (1995) estimates short-run price elasticities of –0.7 for 
consumption and –0.4 for the number of users.  DiNardo (1993) finds that in state-level 1977–87 
Monitoring the Future (MTF) data, past month cocaine participation by high school seniors is 
unrelated to the cocaine price.  From aggregate DUF data on positive tests for each drug, 
Caulkins (1996) imputes population-wide participation price elasticities of –1.48 to –2.08 for 
cocaine and –0.53 to –1.80 for heroin.  Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) estimate participation price 
elasticities of –0.28 for cocaine and –0.94 for heroin among 1988–91 NHSDA respondents.  
Three additional studies estimate past year participation cocaine price elasticities.  Chaloupka et 
al. (1999) estimate elasticities for MTF high school seniors of –0.88 in pooled 1982 and 1989 
data but only –0.24 in 1989.  Using a rational addiction framework, Grossman and Chaloupka 
(1998) estimate elasticities of –0.42 among 18 to 27 year-olds in the 1976–85 MTF panels and   6
follow-ups when individual-specific fixed effects are included and –0.72 when they are omitted.  
Controlling for fixed state effects in pooled 1990–97 NHSDA data, DeSimone and Farrelly 
(2003) estimate an elasticity of –0.36 for respondents aged 18–39. 
 AIDS  Rates.  Among several studies that examine effects of perceived infection risks on 
propensities to engage in risky behaviors or protect against disease transmission by regressing 
behavioral indicators against local disease prevalence rates, three analyze the response of sexual 
behaviors to AIDS rate changes.  Ahituv et al. (1996) estimate a positive effect of state AIDS 
rates on the likelihood that 1984–90 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth respondents use 
condoms during intercourse.  Levine (2001) finds little relationship between state AIDS rates and 
lifetime or current sexual activity and birth control use among 1991–97 Youth Risk Behavior 
Survey respondents.  DeSimone (2002) shows that during 1989–95, promiscuous sexual 
behavior by DUF arrestees decreases when metropolitan area AIDS rates rise.   
  Needle Exchange Programs.  The economics literature has yet to study NEPs.  Many 
health researchers have examined impacts of individual programs, but few have estimated 
aggregate impacts across NEPs.  Lurie and Reingold (1993) summarize the early results.  They 
report no evidence that NEPs increase drug use by clients or in communities, limited evidence 
that NEPs reduce injection frequencies, and abundant evidence that NEPs reduce needle sharing.   
  Subsequent studies have produced similar results.  Seven government-funded reports 
conclude that NEPs reduce rates of HIV infection but do not increase drug use (Lurie and 
DeCarlo 1998, Ruiz-Sierra 2001).  In New York City, NEPs decreased risky injection behavior 
by up to 73 percent, and injectors using NEPs were two-thirds less likely to contract HIV than 
other injectors (Des Jarlais et al. 1996).  Injectors attending Oakland NEPs were 2.5 times more 
likely than other injectors to stop sharing needles after six months (Blumenthal et al. 2000).  In   7
combined data from four cities, NEPs decreased the number of injections per syringe by 44–85 
percent and significantly raised the likelihood that syringes were used only once (Heimer et al. 
1998).  In San Francisco during 1986–92, daily injection frequency among injectors fell from 1.9 
to 0.7 and the fraction of new injectors fell from 3 percent to 1 percent (Watters et al. 1994).  
Washington D.C. NEP participants reported drops of 50 percent in crack cocaine use, 29 percent 
in the number of drug injections, 18 percent in heroin use, and two-thirds in needle sharing (Drug 
Strategies 1999, Klein et al. 1997), compared with the month prior to program entrance.  A 
worldwide survey of 81 (mostly U.S.) cities found that HIV infection rates among injectors 
decreased by 5.8 percent annually in the 29 cities with NEPs and increased by 5.9 percent 
annually in the 52 cities without NEPs (Hurley 1997).  In Hawaii, which opened an NEP in 1990, 
HIV infection rates fell from 5 percent in 1989 to 1.1 percent in 1996 (Vogt et al. 1998).  
  In sum, previous economics studies suggest that injected drugs are normal goods with 
respect to income and prices of cocaine and heroin, which implies the opposite relationship for 
needle sharing if illegally-obtained syringes are sufficiently costly, and the possibility of a 
negative effect of local AIDS prevalence on both drug injection and needle sharing.  Meanwhile, 
prior health research indicates that the opening of an NEP in a city could reduce proximate 
needle sharing while also not increasing, and possibly reducing, drug injection.  
 
III. Data 
  This study examines annual DUF data from 1989–1995 on arrestees in 24 large U.S. 
cities.
4  Hunt and Rhodes (2001) describe the data in detail.  DUF samples individuals arrested in 
                                                 
4 These cities are Atlanta, Birmingham, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, 
Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Omaha, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland 
(OR), Saint Louis, San Antonio, San Diego, San Jose, and Washington D.C.  All are sampled annually during the 
period except Atlanta, Denver, and Omaha in 1989, Miami in 1990, and Kansas City after 1992.       8
the participating cities during one two-week period each quarter.  Those booked within 48 hours 
of arrest are asked at booking to provide information about their drug use along with a urine 
specimen.  Over 90 percent agree to an interview, and about 80 percent of those interviewed 
provide urine samples that are screened for various drugs.  The data available to researchers 
includes only arrestees providing urine samples.  I analyze males aged 18 and above.
5  
    The DUF data are uniquely suited to this study for many reasons, the most obvious being 
that they contain information on recent drug injection and needle sharing.  Beyond that, arrestees 
are a natural group to study because their rates of drug injection are much higher than those of 
the population at large: lifetime drug injection prevalence among males age 18 and above is 1.7 
percent in the NHSDA (SAMHSA 1999) but is 14.1 percent in DUF.  Another advantage is that 
sampling is restricted to 24 large cities, meaning that estimates of prices and HIV risks faced by 
respondents are more precise than when measured at the state level, and making it plausible that 
a simple indicator of local NEP presence could influence reported injection behavior.  Moreover, 
the sample size of 122,623 provides sufficient power to detect relatively small effects.  
 Dependent  Variables.  The dependent variables in the regression analyses are four binary 
indicators of injection behavior based on self-reported drug injection and needle sharing and 
results of urinalyses for cocaine and opiates that detect use within the previous 72 hours.
6  The 
first indicates any drug injection in the previous six months without regard to specific drugs.  
                                                 
5 I drop respondents aged 17 and younger based on the typical legal distinction between adults and juveniles.  
Separate adult and juvenile questionnaires are administered, but the adult sample includes some respondents aged 17 
and younger, while the juvenile sample includes some respondents aged 18–21.  I omit the entire juvenile sample 
because past six month injection rates are low (around 0.5 percent) and personal income is not observed.  Neither 
inclusion of 17 year old adult sample respondents nor omission of respondents age 66 and above (the latter group 
forming only 0.32 percent of the sample) changes the results.  For the adult female sample, which is roughly one-
third the size of the male sample, personal income and AIDS effects are similar to, but slightly weaker than, those 
for males, NEP program impacts are negative but smaller than for males and generally insignificant, and the effects 
of price on injection are usually insignificant for cocaine but positive and significant for heroin. 
6 Although codeine, morphine and methadone are also opiates, I assume that all positive opiate tests represent heroin 
use.  In the 1999 TEDS, the number of individuals seeking heroin treatment was ten times the number seeking 
treatment for all other opiates combined (SAMHSA 2001).   9
This likely underestimates true injection propensities, as respondents evidently underreport 
cocaine and heroin consumption despite agreeing to submit to urine tests for these drugs.  For 
instance, 44 percent of sample respondents test positive for cocaine and 8 percent test positive 
for opiates, but only 21 percent report using cocaine and 6 percent report using heroin in the past 
72 hours.  Rhodes et al. (2000) estimate that, taking into account false positive tests, the 
percentage of respondents truthfully reporting use is 61 for cocaine and 73 for heroin. 
I also construct indicators for current cocaine and heroin injection.  Since respondents do 
not identify the drugs they currently inject, I consider current cocaine (heroin) injectors to be 
those who report both past six month injection and any lifetime cocaine (heroin) injection, and 
also test positive for cocaine (opiates).  Beyond self-reporting and test errors, these measures 
overestimate actual current injection of the corresponding drug, because some positive tests 
likely reflect non-injection administration by arrestees who injected the drug in the past six 
months but not in the previous 72 hours.  As Table 1 indicates, just over a quarter of recent 
injectors do not currently inject either drug, a similar fraction currently inject both drugs, and 
injection of cocaine but not heroin is twice as prevalent as injection of heroin but not cocaine.  
  The remaining dependent variable, an indicator of recent needle sharing, is examined 
separately for samples of all respondents and only those reporting past six month injection.  
Respondents are coded as sharing needles if they report past six month injection, ever sharing 
needles, and sharing some or most of the time (as opposed to not sharing anymore).   
 Explanatory  Variables.  DUF respondents separately report income obtained from legal 
and illegal sources in the past month.  I specify total past month income as the sum of these two 
amounts, and include the percentage of income from illegal sources as an additional variable.
7   
  The remaining explanatory variables of interest are city or metropolitan level measures 
                                                 
7 The income and price variables are converted to 1997 values using the CPI for all urban consumers.   10
that are matched with individual DUF responses.  Data on cocaine and heroin prices are collected 
by undercover drug agents, mostly from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 
recorded in the DEA’s System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE).  These 
prices should be fairly accurate since an unreasonable price offer might tip off the seller and 
endanger the agent.
8  Transaction sizes are standardized to pure gram units because, as Caulkins 
and Padman (1993) and Rhodes et al. (1994) show, quantity discounts exist for both drugs.
9 
  For each drug, I impute annual prices for DUF metropolitan areas from STRIDE 
observations on individual purchases using the OLS regression  
η α α α α α + × + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) ˆ log (log log y m y m r w p ,  (1) 
where p is the price, w is the total gram weight, r is the purity (pure weight divided by w), 
r ˆ log is the predicted value from a regression of log r on log w, m, y, and m × y, m and y are 
vectors of indicators for metropolitan area and year, respectively, m × y is a complete set of 
interactions between metropolitan area and year, and η is the error term.
10  For a particular area 
and year the predicted price is  ) exp( 4 3 2 0
y m y m × + + + α α α α , the median price for one gram of 100 
percent pure drug in the area and year with corresponding indicators set equal to one.  I follow 
Caulkins (1994) in excluding outliers before estimating equation (1).
11  Although the DUF 
                                                 
8 Horowitz (2001) argues that STRIDE cocaine and heroin price data are not representative of actual market prices, 
but most previous drug price studies have used STRIDE, and Caulkins (2001) and Rhodes and Kling (2001) strongly 
disagree with the implication that STRIDE data are not a useful source of information for drug policy. 
9 Amounts injected per session vary, but are typically between 0.1–1 pure grams for cocaine and 10–60 pure 
milligrams for heroin (Rhodes et al. 1994). 
10 For metropolitan areas with insufficient STRIDE observations to construct annual price series, I combine data 
from non-DUF metropolitan areas of similar population size that are in the same census division or region.  These 
areas are Indianapolis, Omaha, and San Jose (defined to include data from Oakland and San Francisco) for both 
drugs and Birmingham, Kansas City, New Orleans, and Phoenix for heroin.  In addition, heroin price data are 
combined for four pairs of cities with the same price assigned to each: Fort Lauderdale and Miami, Houston and San 
Antonio, Cleveland and Indianapolis, and Kansas City and Saint Louis. 
11 The number of STRIDE observations in the equation (1) samples is 21,196 for cocaine and 7,458 for heroin.  I 
omit 500 cocaine and 492 heroin prices with purity below 0.001 percent or above 100 percent, which signify data 
errors or purchases of trivial drug amounts.  Next, I regress log price on log weight and year indicators, and for each 
year discard observations with predicted prices per bulk gram of less than one-eighth or greater than eight times the   11
sampling areas are cities (and occasionally counties), drug prices correspond to the metropolitan 
area to include additional STRIDE observations that improve the precision of the price series. 
  Annual AIDS rates per 1,000 residents are reported on the CDC Wonder web site (at 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/).  The data used here correspond to the 1987 CDC definition of AIDS.
12  
Rates are for the metropolitan area because city-level rates are not published.  I specify the one-
year lagged rate, which eliminates the possibility of reverse causation and conceivably represents 
the state of knowledge regarding infection risks at the time the injection decision is made. 
  NEP-level time series on budgets, clients served and needles exchanged are not available.  
Hence I simply control for local NEP presence with indicators of whether a program has existed 
in the city of arrest for 0–5 months and 6 or more months as of the interview month.  This allows 
for a delayed effect, which might occur if injection behaviors take time to adjust or simply 
because the injection variable spans the previous six months.  Lurie and Reingold (1993) provide 
origination dates for 37 programs known to exist by August 1993, including programs in eight 
DUF cities.  Information on whether and when NEPs opened in remaining DUF cities through 
1995 was graciously provided by Dave Purchase, chair of the North American Syringe Exchange 
Network (Purchase 2002).  Table 2 lists the month and year in which the first NEP opened in 
DUF cities with at least one program.
13   
Figures 1–2 present time series of the dependent variables, while Figures 3–4 do the same 
for the primary explanatory measures.  In Figure 1, past six month injection rates declined 
sharply from 1989 to 1991 and again from 1993 to 1994, and remained relatively constant during 
                                                                                                                                                             
yearly mean.  Finally, I exclude observations with an observed price per pure gram of greater than $3,000 for 
cocaine and $20,000 for heroin.  The latter two steps eliminate only 171 cocaine and 284 heroin price observations. 
12 In 1993 the CDC expanded the definition to include many cases that previously would not have been counted.  
13 The first program in San Francisco, which is 41 miles from San Jose, opened in November 1988, while that in 
Boulder, which is 28 miles from Denver, began in May 1989.  Since many NEP programs are mobile units that 
travel to many different locations within a city, it seems unlikely that drug injectors would travel such distances to 
exchange needles, and thus I ignore the presence of these nearby programs.  Results with the NEP variables recoded 
to include programs in San Francisco and Boulder, though, are quite similar.   12
the remaining years.  Current injection of both drugs moved similarly until 1992, after which 
cocaine injection continued to decline while heroin injection held steady.  The needle sharing 
series mimics that of any injection.  Part of the drop in needle sharing results from sharers 
quitting injection, as falling injection rates were accompanied from 1990–95 by a 30 percent 
decrease in the fraction of injectors who share (Figure 2).  No explanatory variable series can 
explain these results by itself.  In Figure 3, prices spiked upward during the first couple years, 
but sharing among injectors declined precipitously in the second year; prices then fell 
substantially, but injection rates failed to climb in response.  Lagged AIDS rate movements are 
roughly the inverse of those for any injection (Figure 4), but not of those for sharing by injectors 
in several years.  Similarly, the steepest decline in injection and sharing occurred before the 
opening of seven needle exchange programs between December 1990 and October 1992, which 
triggered drastic increases in the proportion of respondents living in cities with NEPs.  
  All regressions also control for various respondent characteristics.  These include age and 
age squared, years of completed education and its square, indicators of black, Hispanic, and other 
race (mutually exclusive, with white omitted), indicators of being married, divorced, widowed, 
and living with a boyfriend or girlfriend, and indicators of (legal) full and part-time employment. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for all respondents (left panel) and past six month 
injectors (right panel), among whom needle sharing is separately analyzed.  Past six month 
injection is reported by 8.5 percent of respondents, but only 60 (43) percent of these are 
classified as current injectors of cocaine (heroin).  Thirty percent of injectors, representing 2.6 
percent of all respondents, share needles.  Drug injectors have higher incomes, face lower drug 
prices and AIDS rates, and are more likely to live in a city with an NEP.  To some extent these 
comparisons simply reflect heterogeneity between injectors and non-injectors, but they also   13
anticipate some of the regression results.
14   
 
IV. Methodology 
  I estimate probit regression models of the form 
) ( ) | 1 Pr( β x x y Φ = =        ( 2 )  
where y is a binary injection or sharing indicator, (.) Φ  is the cumulative normal distribution, x is 
the vector of explanatory variables, and β is the vector of parameters to be estimated.  Tables 5–8 
report marginal effects x ∂ Φ ∂  and their associated standard errors.  Denoting  x as the vector of 
explanatory variable means and  (.) φ  as the normal density function, the marginal effect of 
variable xk equals  k x β β φ ) (  for continuous xk and  − = Φ ) 1 | ( k x xβ ) 0 | ( = Φ k x xβ  for binary xk.  
The tables also report elasticities,  ) ( ) ( β x x x Φ ∂ Φ ∂ , for continuous variables and percentage 
changes in outcomes induced by changes from 0 to 1,  ) ( ) ( β x x Φ ∂ Φ ∂ , in binary variables, and 
list pseudo-R
2 statistics (1 – Le/Lc), where Lc and Le are log likelihoods from the corresponding 
constant-only and regression models, respectively. 
  Because most explanatory variables of interest are measured at the city (or metropolitan 
area) level, all regressions include vectors of city and year indicators.  These control for both the 
documented downward trend in injection propensity and unobserved city-specific, time-invariant 
factors that are correlated with injection or needle sharing.  Consider Table 4, which shows rates 
of recent injection and sharing (among all respondents) by city and year, with rates in bold for 
years in which NEPs were open for the entire year and, in the mean and trend columns, for cities 
that gain NEPs during the period.  Weighting each city and year equally, mean rates in cities 
                                                 
14 For instance, the income difference is partially explained by the relative involvement among each group in illegal 
activities that generate income, as reflected in the variable measuring the percent of income that is illegally obtained, 
and, as discussed subsequently, NEPs are more likely to open in cities with above average injection rates.   14
with NEPs are 2 to 2.5 times larger than in other cities (11.7 percent v. 6.0 percent for injection, 
3.9 percent v. 1.5 percent for sharing).  This positive correlation between NEP presence and both 
injection and sharing, however, does not necessarily imply that NEPs increase injection.
15  The 
relevant question is instead whether injection and sharing declined in cities with NEPs, relative 
to other cities, upon NEP opening.  The inclusion of city and year indicators allows the analysis 
to address this question.  Similarly, coefficients on AIDS prevalence and cocaine and heroin 
prices are identified by temporal changes of these variables within cities. 
  I compare results of regressions specified as indicated thus far to those that also control 
for city-specific linear trends in the dependent variable.  Table 4 indicates that although injection 
and sharing rates are typically lower after an NEP opens, this might be merely a continuation of 
pre-existing downward trends, which for both behaviors are significant at the 95 percent level in 
seven of nine cities with NEPs and about two-thirds of cities overall.  Since these trends vary 
widely across cities, it is unlikely that the year indicators fully account for them, suggesting that 
distinguishing between falling rates and NEP effects might require also controlling for city-
specific trends.  If rates fall faster in NEP cities because they are higher to begin with, simple 
trend effects might be incorrectly attributed to NEPs if city-specific trends are not included. 
 
V. Results 
Table 5 contains the main results of the analysis, comparing models that omit city-
specific regressions to models that include them but are otherwise identically specified.  The 
                                                 
15 But it does imply that NEPs openings are endogenous, in that they are more likely to occur in cities in which the 
behaviors they intend to affect are more prevalent, and thus the public health situation is more urgent.  Further 
emphasizing this, and thus the importance of including city and year indicators (and city-specific trends as described 
below), is evidence from city-level univariate regressions (n = 24) of a significantly positive effect of injection (and 
sharing) rates in 1989 (or 1990 for cities not sampled in 1989) on NEP presence, represented by either an indicator 
of NEP opening during the period or a variable measuring the fraction of the period in which an NEP is open.     15
upper panel displays results for the three injection variables.  Regardless of whether trends are 
included, income positively affects injection of any drug and cocaine, albeit with an elasticity of 
around .01.  In contrast, the inclusion of trends lessens negative effects (and increases positive 
effects) of cocaine prices.  With trends, cocaine injection is own-price responsive whereas heroin 
injection is unresponsive to prices.  The own-price cocaine injection elasticity of –.31 is within 
the –.24 to –.42 range encompassed by several previously cited estimates for cocaine 
participation, though the lack of heroin price effects contradicts existing evidence for heroin use.   
The income and cocaine price results suggest that injectable cocaine is a distinct good 
from powder and crack cocaine, in that the comparison group of non-injectors contains a large 
group of respondents who administer heroin and (especially) cocaine by another method: past six 
month injection is reported by only 13 percent of cocaine positive respondents and 47 percent of 
opiate positive respondents.  One consideration, particularly for heroin, is that drug dealers often 
pass price declines onto consumers by raising purity without changing the nominal price, so that 
as the price falls, purity rises and the drug becomes more convenient to snort or smoke.
16  The 
lack of heroin responsiveness relative to cocaine might therefore be attributable to a greater 
choice of close substitutes for cocaine injection, given that powder and crack cocaine are more 
readily available than heroin pure enough to snort or smoke.  Another possible explanation for 
the income and price effects is that injectors consume more frequently than non-injectors. 
  AIDS prevalence has significant negative effects on all types of injection, supporting the 
hypothesis that individuals become more likely to avoid risky behavior as the inherent risk 
                                                 
16 Figure 3 shows that heroin prices fell by about 60 percent from 1991 to 1995, during which average purity 
increased from 17.3 percent to 40.1 percent.  It is thus possible that the insignificant heroin price could represent a 
combination of a negative “true” price effect and a positive effect through purity changes (although the heroin 
injection decline in Figure 2 took place entirely before prices began to fall).  As an additional explanatory variable, 
predicted heroin purity is indeed negatively related to injection of any drug and heroin, but its insertion does not 
change heroin price results.  Furthermore, results for cocaine purity suggest that price and purity changes are not 
truly independent.  Thus predicted purity, which is used to predict the city-level price, is omitted from the analysis.   16
increases.  A 10 percent increase in the previous year AIDS rate decreases the probability of 
injection by between two and four percent depending on the type of injection.
17  
In the long term, NEPs significantly reduce all three types of injection by 21–25 percent.  
NEPs also reduce injection of any drug and cocaine in the short term.  This is somewhat 
surprising given that NEPs lower the cost of injection by providing free needles.  Some previous 
analyses of NEP effects present similar findings, but none provide a convincing explanation.  
Referrals to drug treatment must play a role.  Lurie and Reingold (1993) find that even though 
NEP clients are typically offered drug treatment only upon request and treatment slots are often 
scarce, 30–40 percent of clients in several cities were referred to treatment, and placement occurs 
more quickly than otherwise.  Thus, many NEPs act as a bridge to drug treatment for injectors 
who visit the NEP because they are seeking treatment.  In addition, the provision of HIV 
counseling and testing by NEPs might reduce injection rates.  Presumably NEP clients are aware 
of HIV infection risks, but this knowledge might be enhanced by information gained from 
program personnel.  Moreover, HIV testing eliminates uncertainty about HIV status.  Watters et 
al. (1994) find that receiving an HIV test result, regardless of the outcome, is a strong predictor 
of not sharing needles.  Such information could diminish injection if clients are concerned about 
the sterility of exchanged needles or simply that continued injection will eventually expose them 
to contaminated needles.  
                                                 
17 An alternative interpretation is that the negative AIDS coefficients primarily reflect sample selection: when AIDS 
rates rise, drug injectors die or become too ill to further inject drugs.  Federal Bureau of Investigation (1996) arrest 
data suggest that in 1995, for instance, 125 of 1,000 male residents of DUF cities were arrestees.  Consider the 
impact of a unit increase in the lagged AIDS rate (1 case per 1,000 residents), which implies an increase of about 1.8 
cases per 1,000 male residents since about 90 percent of those with AIDS are men.   The CDC reports that 35 
percent of identifiable male AIDS cases involve injection on the part of the infected individual, meaning that the 
above increase represents .63 injection-related cases per 1,000 residents.  Under the unrealistically conservative 
assumptions that all AIDS sufferers are rendered unable to inject drugs within a year, the resulting reduction in 
injection probability is .63/125 = .005.  Thus at most about 14 percent of the estimated effect on past six month 
injection can be attributed to selection. 
   17
  The lower panel of Table 5 displays results for current needle sharing.  Income and 
cocaine price effects have switched signs, as predicted, and are significant except for income in 
the sample of all respondents.  This is consistent with price-inelastic injection demand: as prices 
rise, injection drug expenditures occupy more of the budget, and funds to spend on clean needles 
become scarcer.  AIDS rates are negatively related to overall sharing, but have no effect on 
sharing by injectors.  This is intriguing, given that that the primary risk of HIV infection from 
injecting drugs involves using contaminated needles.  Again, some injectors conceivably worry 
about the sterility of seemingly clean needles, and perhaps others simply recognize that injection 
can lead to AIDS or want to further diminish the risk by avoiding injection altogether.  
Meanwhile, NEPs reduce sharing among injectors by 21 percent in the long run, and diminish 
overall sharing by 25 percent in the first six months and by 45 percent thereafter.
18   
  To appreciate these results, it is important to recognize that the effects of each variable on 
past six month injection, sharing among all respondents, and sharing among injectors are related 
because Pr(s) = Pr(i) × Pr(s | i), where i equals injection and s denotes sharing.  If E represents 
elasticity (or percentage change induced by a binary variable change), and z is an explanatory 
variable, then  
E Pr(s), z = E Pr(i), z + E Pr(s | i), z,       ( 3 )  
though empirically this relationship is only an approximation.  Thus the negative (positive) effect 
of income (cocaine price) on sharing by injectors is offset by an inverse effect on injection and 
thus translates to a weaker effect on overall sharing.  Put differently, the effects of income and 
cocaine price on sharing among all respondents are less than the corresponding effects on sharing 
                                                 
18 When selection of injectors is accounted for using a Heckman-type maximum likelihood procedure, identified by 
the past year AIDS rate since it does not affect sharing, results are nearly identical and the selection coefficient is 
insignificant regardless of whether trends are included.  Results are also quite similar when samples are alternatively 
restricted to those who have ever injected any drug and those who have ever injected cocaine or heroin.   18
among injectors because non-injectors are the majority of the full sample, and price hikes and 
income declines decrease injection relative to non-injection.  In contrast, AIDS prevalence and 
NEPs exert downward pressure on both injection and sharing by injectors, and the sum of these 
negative effects is the effect on sharing among all respondents.  While the effect of AIDS on 
injection is sufficiently strong to produce a significant effect on overall sharing despite an 
insignificant effect on sharing by injectors, sizable impacts of NEPs on both injection and 
injector sharing, particularly once programs are in place for six months, result in large impacts 
on overall sharing. 
It is noteworthy that a simple indicator of NEP presence, without controls for program 
size, has a substantial effect on injection behavior.  However, Lurie and Reingold (1993) and 
Watters et al. (1994) report that many NEPs reach large proportions of the local drug injecting 
population.  The earlier cited result from Hurley (1997) regarding the impact of program 
presence on HIV infection rates implies large reductions in injection risk behavior.  
Appendix 1 displays results for the individual characteristics in the Table 5 regressions 
that include city-specific trends.  Likelihoods of both injection and sharing rise with age to the 
mid-40s and fall thereafter, increase with education to grade nine (but only grade seven for 
sharing by injectors) and decline thereafter, are lower for blacks and those of other races than for 
whites, are lower for married men and higher for divorced men than for single men, are lower for 
workers than non-workers, are positively related with the fraction of income earned illegally, and 
decrease over time, though the trend is less pronounced for sharing by injectors. 
  Tables 6–8 display the results of various sensitivity analyses.  All remaining regressions 
control for city-specific trends, with the exception that panel (a) of Table 8 also shows results for 
comparable regressions without trends.  The Table 6 samples omit drug offenders (upper panel)   19
and arrestees reporting drug dealing as their primary past month income source (lower panel).  
About one-sixth of respondents are arrested for drug possession, sales, or use of a controlled 
substance, while three percent report drug dealing.  Past six month injection rates are 11.0 
percent for drug offenders and 19.7 percent for dealers, as opposed to just over eight percent for 
non-drug offenders and non-dealers, so the responses of drug offenders and dealers to 
explanatory variable changes conceivably differ from those of other arrestees.  In fact, though, 
results for these samples are quite similar to those for all respondents.  The only notable 
differences for non-drug offenders compared to the full sample are that cocaine prices do not 
affect cocaine injection, NEPs do not reduce heroin injection, AIDS prevalence has larger 
impacts on heroin injection and overall sharing, and the sizes of NEP effects on any injection and 
overall sharing are 20 percent larger.  For non-dealers, increases in income and AIDS rates no 
longer significantly reduce sharing among injectors and all respondents, respectively. 
  Table 7 examines samples that exclude various cities.  To address the possibility that 
errors in measuring drug prices potentially explain why cocaine prices have no effect on overall 
injection and heroin prices fail to impact any type of injection behavior, the panel (a) sample is 
restricted to cities that do not use cocaine or heroin price data from metropolitan areas not 
sampled by DUF, as previously described.  Though the one-third reduction in sample size 
reduces the significance of some results, the only substantive changes are that AIDS does not 
significantly affect overall sharing, and the heroin price effect on cocaine injection implies that 
the two drugs are substitutes (though the result is not symmetric).  Thus earlier conclusions 
regarding prices are not altered.  Panel (b) restricts the sample to the nine cities in which NEPs 
opened during the period.  The sixty percent decrease in sample size renders income and the 
cocaine price insignificant in the cocaine injection equation, but does not alter the magnitudes of   20
the effects.  Other results are similar to those in Table 5, with AIDS prevalence and NEPs having 
stronger impacts on many types of injection behavior. 
  Finally, Table 8 shows results when self-reported information on past 72 hour cocaine 
and heroin use are utilized.  In panel (a) the cocaine and heroin injection variables are 
constructed using reported drug use rather than drug test results, so that these variables are 
constructed entirely from self-report information rather than a mixture of interview responses 
and urinalysis outcomes.  For cocaine injection the results are similar, though income and 
cocaine price effects are one-third to one-half larger.  For heroin injection, income effects are 
four times larger and become significant, while short-term NEP effects also grow in size and 
become significant.  Panel (b) excludes respondents for whom self-reported and test information 
does not match.  Though some mismatches are produced by incorrect test results, it is likely that 
most are the result of lying by respondents.  Although this restriction excludes 28 percent of the 
main sample, results are again similar.  The primary difference is that the heroin price becomes 
significantly positive in the equations for injection of any drug and cocaine and, consequently, in 
the overall sharing equation. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Controlling for individual characteristics, city and year indicators, and city-specific 
behavioral trends, this study finds that personal income, cocaine prices, AIDS rates, and needle 
exchange programs each have significant effects on arrestee drug injection behavior.  Injected 
cocaine and injected drugs in total, as well as needles used for injecting, are normal goods for 
arrestees.  Cocaine price increases reduce injection, but sufficiently increase needle sharing by 
those who continue injecting so that overall sharing rates rise.  Increases in AIDS prevalence   21
trigger reductions in injection that are large enough to lower overall sharing rates without 
affecting the proportion of injectors who share.  Moreover, the opening of a needle exchange 
program reduces injection by 24 percent and sharing among remaining injectors by 21 percent, 
for an overall decrease in sharing of 45 percent. 
  These results, and their associated policy implications, parallel those of many previous 
economics studies of drug use and risky sexual behavior, with the additional possibility that 
some policies that reduce drug injection might have unintended counteracting consequences on 
needle sharing.  Drug policy that raises cocaine prices will reduce cocaine injection but 
simultaneously increase needle sharing.  Analogous to the findings of Ruhm (2000) that 
economic expansions increase rates of unhealthy behaviors, policies that increase personal 
income, particularly among low income individuals, will increase injection, but reciprocally 
reduce needle sharing by injectors.  The AIDS results provide further support for the hypothesis 
that AIDS outbreaks are self-limiting to the extent that they will reduce behavior leading to 
AIDS (Ahituv et al. 1996), which means policy makers must be aware that increases in drug 
injection and needle sharing are potential inadvertent consequences of programs that reduce HIV 
transmission.   
  Perhaps most significantly, the needle exchange program results not only corroborate 
earlier evidence that NEPs reduce needle sharing, but furthermore indicate that NEPs offer the 
additional benefit of reducing drug injection.  It must be emphasized that in this sample, injection 
and sharing rates are much higher in cities that started NEPs, even after NEPs opened, than in 
other cities.  Impacts of NEPs in cities with low injection and sharing rates before NEP opening 
might by definition be weaker.  For instance, Table 4 indicates that in 1995, average rates in four 
cities that opened NEPs in late 1995 and 1996 – Atlanta, Cleveland, Detroit, and Washington   22
D.C. – were 5.0 percent for injection and 0.8 percent for sharing, compared with 8.8 percent and 
2.7 percent, respectively, in other cities including those where NEPs have been operating for 
years.  Common sense dictates that NEPs will be more effective in cities where they have more 
potential clients and thus can have a larger public health impact. 
  NEPs already have overwhelming support in the scientific community (Ruiz-Sierra 2001) 
and have been publicly endorsed by both former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna 
E. Shalala and former Surgeon General David Satcher.  Although I neither study NEP costs nor 
fully account for NEP benefits, other evidence on the costs of NEPs (Lurie and Reingold 1993, 
Singh et al. 2001) coupled with the large effects of NEPs on drug injection and needle sharing 
found here imply that NEPs might be a cost-effective way to reduce the transmission of HIV, 
particularly in areas with above average injection and sharing rates.  This concurs with 
conclusions from Holtgrave et al. (1998), Lurie and DeCarlo (1998), and Lurie and Reingold 
(1993) that NEP costs per HIV infection prevented are far below the expected lifetime cost of 
treating an HIV-infected individual.  The current federal government ban on NEP funding and 
state drug paraphernalia laws limiting syringe possession and distribution might therefore be ill-
conceived.  For instance, in October 1998, Congress barred the District of Columbia from 
funding NEPs and prohibited all federal NEP funding in D.C.  As a result, the original $220,000 
D.C. NEP closed (though it was soon replaced by a privately-funded program) despite a fiscal 
impact study estimating that failing to provide needle exchange would cost D.C. $8.3 million 
annually.  In contrast, alternatives such as pharmacy syringe sales, physician prescription of 
syringes for drug injection, and automated needle exchange might reduce drug injection and 
needle sharing and thus rates of HIV infection.   23
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TABLE 1.—PAST SIX MONTH INJECTORS CLASSIFIED AS CURRENT COCAINE OR HEROIN INJECTORS 
    Current cocaine injector   
   No  Yes  Total 
No  2,778 (26.5%)  3,222 (30.7%)  6,000 (57.2%)  Current heroin 
injector  Yes  1,472 (14.0%)  3,016 (28.8%)  4,488 (42.8%) 




















TABLE 2.—OPENING DATES OF FIRST NEEDLE 
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN DUF CITIES 
Year Month  City 
1989 November  Portland 
1990 February  New  York 
1991 December  Philadelphia 
1992  January  Chicago, San Diego 
  June  Dallas, Los Angeles 
 July  San  Jose 
 October  Indianapolis 
   T h e   r emaining 15 DUF cities did not have NEPs during the sample period. 
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TABLE 3.—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Sample: All  Respondents 
(n = 122,623) 
 Drug  injectors 













Dependent  variables                   
Injected drugs past 6 months  .0855  .2797       
Currently injects cocaine  .0509  .2197       
Currently injects heroin  .0366  .1878       
Currently shares needles  .0257   .1582    .3003  .4584 
         
Main explanatory variables                     
Past month income (in $10,000s)  .1308     .3116    .1976     .4823 
Cocaine price (in $100s)  1.296     .3818    1.238     .3678 
Heroin price (in $1,000s)  1.046     .5535    .9389     .5008 
Past year AIDS rate (per 1,000 residents)  .2541     .2009    .2312     .1633 
NEP in city for 0–5 months  .0405     .1972    .0526     .2233 
NEP in city for 6 or more months  .2084     .4062    .2665     .4421 
         
Other explanatory variables                     
Age  29.75     9.159    34.06     7.987 
Age squared  968.9     647.8    1224     579.7 
Education  11.29     2.276    11.28     2.230 
Education squared  132.7     46.65    132.1     45.91 
Black  .5611     .4963    .3333     .4714 
Hispanic  .1818     .3857    .2445     .4298 
Other  .0145     .1197    .0071     .0837 
Married  .1538     .3608    .1420     .3490 
Cohabiting  .1368     .3437    .1333     .3399 
Divorced  .1489     .3560    .2691     .4435 
Widow  .0061     .0776    .0114      .1064 
Works full time  .3992     .4897    .2397     .4269 
Works part time  .1432     .3502    .1237     .3292 
Percent of income that is illegally obtained  .1032     .2748    .2750     .4008 
  Current cocaine (heroin) injectors are respondents who jointly tested positive for cocaine (opiates), injected drugs in the 
past 6 months, and injected cocaine (heroin) previously.  Income and prices are in 1997 dollars.  The AIDS rate is the number of 
cases in the metropolitan area per 1,000 residents. 
   32
TABLE 4.—PAST SIX MONTH INJECTION AND RECENT NEEDLE SHARING RATES, BY CITY AND YEAR 
(a) Past six month injection rates 
City  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Mean  Trend 
San  Diego  .273 .221 .209 .171 .181 .147 .131 .191  -.021
* 
Birmingham  .117 .070 .046 .033 .034 .020 .020 .049  -.014
* 
Los  Angeles  .177 .160 .137 .132 .117 .106 .103 .133  -.012
* 
Chicago  .105 .063 .059 .032 .026 .031 .038 .051  -.011
* 
New  Orleans  .105 .089 .061 .046 .045 .043 .035 .061  -.011
* 
New York  .152  .141  .102 .121 .110 .087 .084 .114  -.011
* 
Detroit  .104 .051 .055 .050 .038 .035 .025 .051  -.010
* 
Houston  .059 .084 .074 .053 .040 .025 .021 .051  -.010
* 
Philadelphia  .153 .093 .099 .100 .083 .093 .069 .099  -.010
* 
San  Antonio  .186 .161 .151 .147 .148 .146 .102 .149  -.010
* 
Atlanta    .066 .040 .032 .030 .021 .016 .034  -.009
* 
Kansas  City  .061 .044 .042 .032        .045  -.009
* 
Cleveland  .069 .052 .042 .046 .039 .020 .023 .041  -.007
* 
Dallas  .090 .100 .075 .076 .070 .070 .054 .076  -.006
* 
Wash.  D.C.  .078 .087 .078 .086 .076 .057 .054 .074  -.005
* 
San  Jose  .087 .104 .107 .086 .084 .087 .066 .089  -.004
* 
Ft.  Lauderdale  .033 .021 .014 .010 .007 .012 .011 .015  -.003
* 
Phoenix  .147 .133 .112 .132 .123 .110 .135 .128 -.003 
Portland .245  .177 .175 .208 .203 .172 .207 .198 -.003 
St.  Louis  .073 .054 .057 .047 .047 .050 .056 .055 -.002 
Miami  .005    .018 .023 .027 .009 .019 .017 -.001 
Indianapolis  .100 .074 .108 .124 .111 .095 .088 .100 .000 
Omaha    .065 .036 .039 .049 .044 .057 .048 .000 
Denver    .073 .079 .073 .067 .084 .123 .083 .007 
           
(b) Needle sharing rates (all respondents) 
City  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Mean  Trend 
Los  Angeles  .097 .099 .074 .067 .054 .044 .032 .067  -.012
* 
San  Diego  .133 .092 .078 .060 .083 .050 .051 .078  -.012
* 
San  Antonio  .071 .075 .071 .058 .038 .045 .031 .056  -.008
* 
Chicago  .041 .017 .011 .007 .005 .005 .007 .013  -.005
* 
New  Orleans  .036 .029 .018 .008 .011 .007 .007 .017  -.005
* 
Philadelphia  .043 .029 .020 .017 .011 .018 .008 .021  -.005
* 
Portland .091  .069 .046 .068 .064 .049 .050 .062  -.005
* 
Cleveland  .024 .024 .009 .010 .003 .003 .006 .011  -.004
* 
Houston  .026 .030 .026 .017 .013 .008 .007 .018  -.004
* 
New York  .049  .043  .021 .024 .021 .022 .021 .029  -.004
* 
Birmingham  .019 .014 .005 .006 .000 .003 .002 .007  -.003
* 
Kansas  City  .017 .005 .007 .006        .009 -.003 
Atlanta    .012 .004 .005 .005 .003 .000 .005  -.002
* 
Dallas  .031 .031 .022 .025 .029 .021 .018 .025  -.002
* 
Detroit  .014 .013 .010 .012 .007 .000 .003 .008  -.002
* 
Ft.  Lauderdale  .009 .009 .007 .002 .001 .001 .002 .005  -.002
* 
St.  Louis  .019 .013 .010 .007 .007 .007 .005 .010  -.002
* 
Denver    .026 .022 .017 .013 .010 .021 .018 -.002 
San  Jose  .026 .041 .043 .029 .030 .030 .021 .031 -.002 
Indianapolis  .018 .011 .028 .037 .028 .018 .009 .021 .000 
Miami  .005    .003 .007 .005 .001 .008 .005 .000 
Omaha    .009 .005 .002 .008 .005 .007 .006 .000 
Phoenix  .050 .034 .032 .049 .036 .032 .048 .040 .000 
Wash.  D.C.  .004 .007 .009 .007 .004 .004 .007 .006 .000 
  Means weight each year equally.  Trends are slope coefficients in a within-city univariate regression of rate on year.  A 
* denotes that the trend coefficient is significant at the 95 percent level.  The trends for Miami omit 1989 data.   33
TABLE 5.—MAIN SAMPLE RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT CITY-SPECIFIC TRENDS 
Dependent variable:  Any injection    Cocaine injection    Heroin injection 
City-specific  trends:  No Yes    No Yes    No Yes 





































































-.0379                
Past year AIDS rate  
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-.2141                
χ
2 (Wald test for city trend sig.)    183.7
a     189.1
a     183.7
a 
Predicted injection rate at mean  .0439  .0432    .0247  .0241    .0098  .0095 
Pseudo R
2  .2132 .2158    .1868 .1907    .2489 .2519 
              
Dependent variable:  Sharing (all)    Sharing (injectors)     
City-specific  trends:  No Yes    No Yes       

















    



















    


















    
              
Past year AIDS rate  
















    
              
















    
              



















    
              
χ
2 (Wald test for city trend sig.)    88.65
a     38.67
b      
Predicted sharing rate at mean  .0081  .0077    .2852  .2843       
Pseudo R
2  .2256 .2287    .0711 .0741       
  Sample sizes are 10,488 for sharing among injectors and 122,623 for remaining samples.  Parentheses contain standard 
errors.  Coefficients and standard errors are in probit marginal effect terms.  Italics represent elasticities for continuous variables 
and the percentage effect of a 0 to 1 change in NEP indicators.  Marginal and percentage effects and elasticities are evaluated at 
the explanatory variable means.  Superscripts 
c, 
b, and 
a denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels, respectively.  All 
regressions include the variables listed in Appendix 1 as well as city indicators.   34
 TABLE 6.—RESULTS FOR SAMPLES EXCLUDING DRUG OFFENDERS OR DEALERS 










Specification:  (a) Excludes drug offenders 
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Past year AIDS rate  
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-.2324             
Predicted dependent variable mean  .0396    .0213    .0076    .0072    .2960 
Dependent  variable  mean  .0808  .0476  .0329  .0251  .3107 
Pseudo R
2  .2201  .2011  .2672  .2350  .0725 
           
Specification:  (b) Excludes those reporting drug dealing as primary income source 
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Past year AIDS rate  
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-.1960             
Predicted dependent variable mean  .0421    .0233    .0092    .0074    .2797 
Dependent  variable  mean  .0822  .0486  .0351  .0243  .2958 
Pseudo R
2  .2084  .1870  .2485  .2231  .0738 
  Regressions in (a) include 102,449 total respondents and 8,276 injectors; those in (b) include 119,010 total respondents 
and 9,777 injectors.  Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are in probit marginal effect terms.  Italics represent 
elasticities for continuous variables and the percentage effect of a 0 to 1 change in NEP indicators.  Marginal and percentage 
effects and elasticities are evaluated at the explanatory variable means.  Superscripts 
c, 
b, and 
a denote significance at the 90, 95, 
and 99 percent levels, respectively.  All regressions include the variables listed in Appendix 1, city indicators and city trends.   35
TABLE 7.—RESULTS FOR SAMPLES EXCLUDING CITIES WITHOUT MATCHING PRICE DATA OR NEP 










Specification: (a)  Excludes  cities using price data from other metropolitan areas 
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Past year AIDS rate  
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-.2043             
Predicted dependent variable mean  .0461    .0269    .0144    .0095    .3063 
Dependent  variable  mean  .0934  .0563  .0462  .0300  .3215 
Pseudo R
2  .2271  .1946  .2395  .2278  .0730 
           
Specification:  (b) Excludes cities in which no NEPs opened during sample period 

























































.0528             
Past year AIDS rate  
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-.2988             
Predicted dependent variable mean  .0727    .0403    .0233    .0169    .3292 
Dependent  variable  mean  .1179  .0713  .0554  .0400  .3395 
Pseudo R
2  .1995  .1779  .2166  .2008  .0631 
  Regressions in (a) include 83,679 total respondents and 7,817 injectors; those in (b) include 51,103 total respondents 
and 6,026 injectors.  Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are in probit marginal effect terms.  Italics represent 
elasticities for continuous variables and the percentage effect of a 0 to 1 change in NEP indicators.  Marginal and percentage 
effects and elasticities are evaluated at the explanatory variable means.  Superscripts 
c, 
b, and 
a denote significance at the 90, 95, 
and 99 percent levels, respectively.  All regressions include the variables listed in Appendix 1, city indicators and city trends.   36
TABLE 8.—RESULTS USING SELF-REPORTED CURRENT USE OF COCAINE AND HEROIN 
Specification:  (a) Data on current cocaine and heroin use are self-reported 
Dependent variable:  Cocaine injection    Heroin injection 


















































.0364           
Past year AIDS rate  
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-.2427           
City-specific trends:  No  Yes   No  Yes 
Predicted dependent variable mean  .0204  .0199    .0115  .0113 
Dependent variable mean  .0428  .0428    .0402  .0402 
 
Specification:  (b) Excludes respondents for whom self-reports and urine tests differ 
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Past year AIDS rate  
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-.2040             
Predicted  dependent  variable  mean  .0387  .0202  .0062  .0072  .2988 
Dependent  variable  mean  .0781  .0458  .0324  .0245  .3140 
  Regressions in (a) include all respondents and injectors; those in (b) include 87,932 total respondents and 6,864 
injectors.  Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are in probit marginal effect terms.  Italics represent elasticities for 
continuous variables and the percentage effect of a 0 to 1 change in NEP indicators.  Marginal and percentage effects and 
elasticities are evaluated at the explanatory variable means.  Superscripts 
c, 
b, and 
a denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 
percent levels, respectively.  All regressions include the variables listed in Appendix 1, city indicators and city trends.   37
APPENDIX 1.—EFFECTS OF OTHER VARIABLES 



























































































































































































































Percent of income 


















































































































  These regressions correspond to the models with city-specific trends in Table 5 and include the variables listed there as 
well as city indicators.  Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are in probit marginal effect terms.  Superscripts 
c, 
b, and 
a denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent levels, respectively. 